Fifteen Years of Transformation in the Post-Communist World by Oleh Havrylyshyn
The collapse of the Soviet empire freed hundreds ofmillions of people from communism. In most ofthe post-communist world, political freedom was
followed by economic liberalization. The transition from
central planning to the free market was uneven, however.
In the early days after the fall of communism, two
schools of thought about economic reform emerged. Some
economists argued for a rapid break with the past, whereas
others favored a more gradual approach. With the passage
of time, it is now clear that rapid reforms were on the whole
better than gradual reforms. Countries that adopted far-
reaching reforms tended to experience higher growth rates
and lower inflation and received more foreign investment.
Inequality increased less among rapid reformers than
among gradual reformers. The same is true with respect to
poverty rates. 
Importantly, rapid reformers developed better institu-
tions than countries that opted for gradualism. In fact, all
of the rapid reformers developed into liberal democracies,
whereas in many of the gradual reformers, such as Russia,
small groups of super-wealthy oligarchs captured the state
and dominated its economic decisionmaking. The efficien-
cy of large-scale privatizations was not dependent on the
speed but on the transparency and honesty of the process. 
Future reformers should not be afraid of adopting rapid
reforms. To gain maximum benefits from economic reforms,
however, they need to ensure that the privatization process is
more transparent than it has been in the past.
In countries where the state has been captured by a small
clique of oligarchs, rapid reforms may be politically impos-
sible in the short run. Still, liberalization of the business
environment, especially with regard to small and medium-
sized enterprises, could stimulate the economy without
being seen as a threat by the ruling oligarchy.
the cato institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001-5403
www.cato.org
Phone (202) 842-0200  Fax (202) 842-3490
n o v e m b e r  9 ,  2 0 0 7   ● n o .  4
Fifteen Years of Transformation
in the Post-Communist World
Rapid Reformers Outperformed Gradualists
by Oleh Havrylyshyn
Oleh Havrylyshyn is a research scholar at the University of Toronto’s Munk Centre for International Studies. He is the former Ukrainian deputy 
minister of finance, a former senior International Monetary Fund official, and the author of  Divergent Paths in Post-Communist
Transformation: Capitalism for All or Capitalism for the Few? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
Executive Summary
Introduction
On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall fell,
marking the end of the communist experi-
ment and the beginning of the end of the
Soviet empire. That momentous historical
event has come to symbolize the end of the
Cold War, the freeing of millions of people
from an authoritarian state that had kept
them closed off from the rest of the world, and
the liberalization of national economies from
the constraints of socialist central planning.
The euphoria of the moment was widely
shared, not only by the citizens of the socialist
countries, but by many others around the
globe. Unsurprisingly that euphoria was
accompanied by high hopes of quickly achiev-
ing the same degree of democratic freedom
and economic well-being enjoyed by the
advanced West. Equally unsurprising, those
unrealistic expectations were not quickly ful-
filled, and by the mid-1990s disillusionment
began to replace euphoria in many, but not all,
former communist countries. 
Analysts understand that economic mira-
cles do not happen in a few years. They all
expected output to fall before picking up
again.1 But the extent of the output decline
was larger in most countries than most econo-
mists had expected, and the initial social
impact of the transition was unquestionably
painful. Did that decline justify the many
alarm calls of the mid-90s, typified by the
United Nations Development Programme’s
statement that the transition in the post-com-
munist world had brought about “the most
acute poverty and welfare reversal in the
world?”2
In particular, was it right to attribute the
worst effects of transition to the application of
“shock-therapy,” as many writers did in the
case of the Russian reforms? This paper shows
that such assessments were at best premature,
often exaggerated, and not applicable to many
better-performing countries—even at the
beginning of the transition process. Most
importantly, social costs were greatest in grad-
ual, not rapid, reformers.
It was natural for scholars to undertake a
mid-term review of the transformation pro-
cess. However, given that an initial reduction of
output was widely recognized as unavoidable,
some of the reviews were less than honest
about qualifying their preliminary results and
overly eager to conclude that the transition had
been a failure. It is now possible to review the
transition experience over 15 years for which
we have data—a period long enough to capture
not only negative impacts of the early demise
of central planning, but also the positive effects
of the transition to a market economy. 
The transition process was marked by a
wide divergence in economic performance
among the former communist countries.3
Some countries have prospered, while others
have stagnated. That divergence raises a cru-
cial question for future reformers elsewhere in
the world: What type of reform strategy leads
to superior outcomes? 
With the passage of time, it is now possible
to conclude that rapid reforms were on the
whole better than gradual reforms, the effec-
tiveness of large-scale privatization was not
dependent on the speed but on the trans-
parency and honesty of the process, and the
best path for institutional development was
not to delay liberalization. In fact, countries
that moved early and fast on macroeconomic
stabilization and liberalization also built bet-
ter institutions such as independent judicia-
ries that protect private property rights. 
Reform Strategies:
Theory and Practice
A popular refrain in the early 1990s said
that “there is no precedent for moving from
socialism to capitalism.” That refrain was used
legitimately to emphasize the difficulties in
finding the optimal path of transition, but it
was also used by the opponents of reform to
try to slow down the pace of economic liberal-
ization. To say that there was no precedent is
not to say there were no road maps. In fact,
plenty of road maps were produced inside the
former Soviet empire and outside. 
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Table 1, for example, shows the main
aspects of the so-called Washington Consen-
sus. The Washington Consensus refers to the
broadly shared views on transition policies
held by the international financial institutions
(IFIs) such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund and by the pro-
ponents of the big-bang approach to econom-
ic reforms, such as the former finance minister
of Poland Leszek Balcerowicz, former Czech
prime minister Vaclav Klaus, and former
Russian prime minister Yegor Gaidar.4 Big-
bangers worried that going too slow would
create large opportunities for rent-seeking by
both old and new industries, and thus create
vested interests opposed to liberalization. It
was better to use the short “honeymoon” peri-
od of the post-communist euphoria, they rea-
soned, to quickly put in place the new liberal
regime and prevent reform reversals. To deal
with unemployment, big-bangers proposed
social safety nets that were to be implemented
immediately.
The Washington Consensus has become a
straw man for those who favored gradual
reforms and the “institutions-first” approach
to transformation from communism to capi-
talism. Early gradualists, including Philippe
Aghion of Harvard University and Olivier
Blanchard of MIT, argued that the magnitude
of dislocations would be very large given the
huge inefficiencies of the socialist economy.
To avoid those dislocations, they argued that
the changes should be gradual, allowing time
for new industries and jobs to be created as old
ones were closed or restructured.5 Both
schools of thought recognized the importance
of institutions, but it was undoubtedly more
central to the thinking of the gradualists, who
argued for delaying liberalization until better
institutions were put in place.6
Going beyond that broad summary, the dif-
ferences become nuanced especially when it
comes to the sequencing of reforms. In the case
of the Washington Consensus, of the 10
dimensions of reform, 5 were to be early and
rapid. Those 5 were macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, market liberalization, trade liberalization,
legal reforms, and (notably) unemployment
compensation. The rest, including large-scale
privatization, were to start later and take a long
time. 
Gradualists accepted the need for a rapid
macroeconomic stabilization and in many
cases saw the value of early privatization of
small-scale entities as well as the freedom to
start new businesses.7 In the early debates, the
gradualists wanted institutions to develop
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Table 1
Washington Consensus: Reform Policies and Timing of Implementation 
Policy Type 1–2 yrs 2–5 yrs 5+ yrs
Macroeconomic stabilization implementation continuation continuation
Price and market reform implementation continuation continuation
Trade liberalization implementation continuation continuation
Labor market reform preparation implementation continuation
Financial reform preparation implementation continuation
Small privatization implementation implementation continuation
Private sector development implementation implementation continuation
Large privatization and governance preparation implementation continuation
Legal: tax, property rights, commercial codex, etc. implementation continuation continuation
Institutional reform (administration, regulation) implementation implementation implementation
Unemployment insurance implementation continuation continuation
Source: Adapted from Stanley Fischer and Alan Gelb, “The Process of Socialist Economic Transformation,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 4 (Fall 1991).
before any liberalization took place, and by the
mid-1990s they criticized the Washington
Consensus for paying lip service to institu-
tions-building.8 In fact, the building of insti-
tutions lagged far behind other reforms,
including large-scale privatization. The infa-
mous loans-for-shares privatization in Russia,
for example, has become a lightning rod for
the gradualist and institutionalist criticism of
the big-bangers.9
The key differences between the two views
can thus be summarized as follows:
1. Big-bangers worried that delays in stabi-
lization and liberalization would result
in huge rent-seeking and opposition to,
and perhaps reversal of, reforms.
2. Big-bangers agreed on the need for insti-
tutions but not necessarily in advance of
reforms.
3. Gradualists feared that moving too fast
would cause greater social costs and pain
for the population.
4. Gradualists proposed that institutions
come before liberalization and privatiza-
tion to ensure maximum efficiency
gains.
As will be shown below, the evidence sug-
gests that the big-bangers were right to argue
that rent-seeking blossoms with too much
delay in reforms. They were also right to argue
that institutions could come slightly later
than reforms. The gradualists, on the other
hand, were wrong to argue that moving too
fast would cause greater social costs than
moving more slowly, but they were right to
argue that institutions enhance efficiency
gains. 
Related to the debate about the efficacy of
the economic reforms was the debate about
the effect of economic reforms on democrati-
zation. For example, Adam Przeworski of New
York University hypothesized that in a democ-
racy the pain of reforms would result in a new
anti-reform or populist government winning
the next elections and reversing the reforms.10
Thus, he worried that market liberalization
and democratic liberalization are not compat-
ible. This paper provides empirical evidence
that contradicts Przeworski’s thesis.
Defining the Big-Bang
and Gradualism
Transition in most countries has gone so
far that the debate over the speed of transition
may seem to be only of historical interest.
However, the debate still persists, with gradu-
alists “showing” results confirming their
point of view and big-bangers “showing”
results confirming theirs.11 Part of the diffi-
culty is that classifying particular reformers as
rapid or gradual has been somewhat arbitrary.
That arbitrary classification was possible
because the transition process involved many
dimensions, leaving room for labeling the
same country fast or slow.
After 1989, for example, Poland was consid-
ered a rapid transformer. Beginning in 1992,
Russia was also designated as a rapid reformer
by some analysts, though not all. Two very influ-
ential studies, one by Peter Reddaway from
George Washington University and Dmitri
Glinski from Columbia University and the
other by Joseph Stiglitz also from Columbia
University, critiqued shock-therapy’s failures by
focusing on the Russian example. They argued
that rapid liberalization and privatization result-
ed in great social, economic, and political dam-
age.12 Neither study had much to say about
Poland, which, by the time those two studies
came out, was widely considered a success.13
Stiglitz’s critics argued that the Russian
reforms of 1992 were not a proper example of
a big-bang approach to reform, because they
stalled and were, to some extent, reversed, and
important macroeconomic stabilization was
not achieved until 1999. In response to that
criticism, Stiglitz now seems to have redefined
transition speed as pertaining only to large-
scale privatization and on that narrow mea-
sure, Stiglitz labels Russia as an unsuccessful
big-bang case and Poland a successful gradu-
alist case.14 But Stiglitz’s focus on large-scale
privatization as a defining difference between
big-bang countries and gradualist countries is
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surely too selective. Except for large-scale pri-
vatization, Poland undertook all the relevant
reforms fairly rapidly. 
To get a better sense of the uneven pace of
reforms in different countries, consider the
most widely used index of transition in the
post-communist world, the Transition Pro-
gress Indicator, which is estimated annually by
the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. The TPI measures the degree of
a country’s market-orientation on a scale from
1 to 4.5, with 1 denoting a centrally planned
regime and 4.5 denoting a fully functioning
market. The TPI has several dimensions,
including price and trade liberalization, com-
petition policy, governance, small and large
scale privatization, and liberalization of the
banking and financial sectors. 
Figure 1 shows the TPI ratings for 28 for-
mer communist countries in 2004. The coun-
tries are grouped into six categories: Central
Europe (CE), the Baltics, South-East Europe
(SEE), members of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) with a moderate
degree of reforms (CISM), and three CIS mem-
bers with very limited reforms (CISL).
The speed and the scope of reforms in the
first few years after the end of the communist
rule are essential to distinguishing between
the two approaches. Therefore, I have defined
as rapid reformers those countries that saw
their TPI score increase by 1 point or more
over a period of three years.
I made two adjustments. First, some coun-
tries, such as Hungary and two former Yugoslav
republics, which started off with advanced ini-
tial TPI values (well above 1.0) undertook eco-
nomic reforms at a slower pace than the main
big-bang countries, such as Poland and the
then-Czechoslovakia, but attained similar TPI
values after 3 or 4 years. I have labeled them as
Advanced Start/Steady Progress countries.
Second, some countries made a big initial leap
in the TPI ratings, but did not sustain the pace
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Figure 1 
EBRD Transition Progress Indicator, 2004
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Transition Report 2004 (London: EBRD, 2004), http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/series/tr.htm. 
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of reform. Typically, countries where inflation
exceeded 5 percent per month also reversed
some of their early liberal economic reforms.
Those I labeled as Aborted Big-Bang coun-
tries.15
Table 2 shows that only six countries can
truly be called Sustained Big-Bang reformers.
Those countries made a big leap toward lib-
eralization in the first few years after the end
of communist rule. They have achieved and
sustained low inflation, and steadily in-
creased their TPI scores through the present.
The Advance Start/Steady Progress countries
moved more slowly at first—perhaps because
of their advanced starting position—but pro-
gressed steadily to TPI levels enjoyed by the
Sustained Big-Bang countries by the mid-
1990s. Aborted Big-Bang countries saw large
TPI increases in the first few years, but their
pace of reform was not sustained and/or
inflation returned. Since the big-bang
approach to reform in those countries was
aborted, the third category in effect falls into
a gradualist grouping. The countries in
Gradual Reforms category adopted gradual-
ism from early on. In those countries, macro-
economic stabilization and meaningful liber-
alization were delayed for at least two to three
years and, in some cases, longer. Finally, the
Limited Reforms category is comprised of
countries that have made very limited
progress from a Soviet-like economy.16
Different Strategies and
Different Outcomes
The TPI reflects not only price and trade lib-
eralization, but also the evolution of market-
related institutions, including improvements in
the climate of open competition and corporate
governance. It is thus widely used as an overall
indicator of progress toward the market econo-
my. But some critics of the big-bang approach to
reform note some serious shortcomings of the
TPI, most importantly its inability to reflect the
concentration of economic and political power
in the hands of a few very wealthy “oligarchs” as
in Russia and Ukraine.17 That shortcoming rais-
es the question as to the “quality” of the market
economy that the TPI represents. It is thus
important to look at more direct measures of
performance or outcomes of the transition. 
In the discussion below, I evaluate the five
groups of former communist countries as
categorized by the TPI according to their per-
formance on a variety of indicators, including
institutional development, economic perfor-
mance and dislocation that accompanied the
reform process. With a few exceptions, coun-
6
All of the 
rapid reformers
developed 
into liberal
democracies.
Table 2
Transition Countries Grouped by Early Reform Strategies 
Sustained Advance Start/ Aborted Gradual Limited
Big-Bang Steady Progress Big-Bang Reforms Reforms
Estonia Croatia Albania Azerbaijan Belarus
Latvia Hungary Bulgaria Armenia Uzbekistan
Lithuania Slovenia Macedonia Georgia Turkmenistan
Czech Republic Kyrgyzstan Kazakhstan
Poland Russia Ukraine
Slovakia Tajikistan
Romania
Note: Slovakia underwent rapid economic reforms between 1990 and 1992, when it was a part of the Czechoslovak
federation.
tries that started their reforms early and res-
olutely achieved the best results.
Early Liberalizers Moved Fastest on
Institutions
Although many indicators of institutional
development now exist for all countries,
including those in transition, I return to the
EBRD’s because it provides a more consistent
time series for the former communist coun-
tries than do other estimates, and it also allows
direct comparison with other indicators of lib-
eralization.18 Table 3 breaks down the TPI
data into those dealing with market liberaliza-
tion (LIB) and those dealing with institutional
development (INST). Based on the evidence,
several very important conclusions can be
drawn. First, in all former communist coun-
tries institutional development lagged far
behind economic liberalization. Second, those
countries that moved early and rapidly on lib-
eralization also moved fastest on institutional
development. Third, in no country, including
the gradualist countries, did institutional
development precede liberalization. 
In CISL countries, political leaders often
claimed that they were moving gradually on
reforms in order to avoid the mistakes of
Russia’s “shock therapy.” They also claimed
that they were building a social-market econo-
my by preparing the institutional base before
undertaking economic liberalization. Table 3
suggests the opposite. The CISL countries not
only lag on economic liberalization, they also
lag on institutional development. The CISM
countries have progressed slightly farther on
institutions but lag well behind the CE and
Baltic leaders. Only SEE, where some coun-
tries still suffer from conflict or post-conflict
problems, is comparable to CISM. 
Consequently, it is possible to argue that
the theory of gradualism was abused by polit-
ical leaders in the less liberalized countries.
Those leaders were not interested in real eco-
nomic and institutional reforms but used the
gradualist arguments to delay reforms, which,
as shown below, resulted in large rent-seeking
and state capture. Conversely, it may be
argued that the leadership committed to firm
progress on economic liberalization was also
committed to progress on institutional devel-
opment. 
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Table 3 
Sequence of Economic Liberalization and Institutional Development
Countries Index 1994 1999 2005
Central Europe LIB 3.7 4.2 4.3
INST 2.7 3.1 3.3
Baltics LIB 3.7 4.1 4.3
INST 2.3 2.9 3.2
South-East Europe LIB 3.0 4.0 4.1
INST 1.7 2.2 2.5
CISM LIB 2.2 3.7 3.9
INST 1.4 2.1 2.2
CISL LIB 1.9 2.0 2.3
INST 1.4 1.6 1.5
Source: Based on EBRD’s 2000 and 2005 Transition Report country tables, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/
series/tr.htm.
Notes: Liberalization (LIB) is the average of the following indicators: price liberalization, foreign exchange and trade
liberalization, and small-scale privatization. Institutional reform (INST) is the average of the following indicators: cor-
porate governance and restructuring, large-scale privatization, competition policy, banking reforms and other financial
sector reforms.
Early Reformers Had Best Economic
Performance
Table 4 compares the five categories of for-
mer communist countries with three different
indicators of economic performance between
1989 and 2003. The first column shows the
index of GDP relative to 1989—the year that is
commonly used as when transition began.
That column shows that, with the exception
of the CISL countries, states with more
advanced market reforms have achieved
stronger recovery from the recessions that fol-
lowed the collapse of communism. 
Some scholars, including Anders Aslund of
the Peter G. Peterson Institute for Inter-nation-
al Economics, have argued that evaluation of
the reform process with 1989 as the base year
overstates the decline of output during the
years of recession, because communist statistics
overstated output by including production of
zero or negative value and not reflecting nega-
tive value of shortages and queues. For coun-
tries outside CE, the 1989 benchmark also over-
states the decline attributable to transition,
which did not begin in many countries until
1992 and, in some cases, even later.
Aslund has taken into account some of the
above effects on GDP and has calculated new
estimates. The second column of Table 4
shows economic performance in post-com-
munist countries adjusted—conservatively—
for only half of Aslund’s estimates. Even those
adjustments strengthen my conclusions:
broader and more rapid reforms resulted in
earlier and stronger GDP recovery. Still, the
CISL performance remains a puzzle. That may
be partly because of the overstatement of GDP
growth rates in those still very Soviet-like
economies and because the economic down-
turn, though ultimately unavoidable, was
temporarily postponed as were reforms. It is
also notable that the good output record of
the CISL countries is not entirely consistent
with the indicators of wellbeing that I discuss
later. (In the case of Belarus, for example, the
high GDP growth rate is related to a signifi-
cant Russian energy subsidy.)
Median inflation values for each group are
shown in column 3. They too correlate with
the degree of reforms. The CISL countries, for
example, have the highest inflation rates in the
region—suggesting that Soviet-era policies of
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Table 4
Economic Performance Indicators in 2003
2003–2004
GDP Index GDP Index Median Annual Cumulative FDI
(1989=100) (Aslund Adjustment) Inflation, % Per Capita, $US
Central Europe 115 139 2.5 2,305
Baltics 90 112 0.9 1,641
SEE 82 86 8.8 465
CISM 67 84 9.7 339
CISL 104 n.a. 13.3 168
Source: All data are from EBRD Transition Report 2004, except column 3, which is taken from Oleh Havrylyshyn,
Divergent Paths in Post-Communist Transformation: Capitalism for All or Capitalism for the Few? (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2006), chap. 3.
Note: The three indicators in Table 4 have not been updated beyond 2003 in part because of the strong influence of the
boom in the energy sector on the economic performance of the CIS countries. Also, it is important to note that Aslund
calculated his adjustment only up to the year 2000. Projecting his calculations three years ahead, as Table 4 does, may
be reasonable, but extending those projections by another three years would be methodologically questionable. Still,
even when 2006 values are used, the relative ranking of the country groups remains the same. 
providing cheap credit to inefficient industries
continue. The dramatic differences seen in
cumulative foreign direct investment per capi-
ta figures in column 4 speak for themselves. 
The superior performance of the big-bang
countries is explained not only by the degree
of market reforms. A detailed econometric
analysis also concludes that the greater the
degree of market reforms in the first decade,
the better the economic performance.19
Gradual Reformers Suffered More Social
Pain, Not Less
A key motivation for gradualism was the
concern that rapid reforms would impose too
great a social cost in the form of unemploy-
ment, income deterioration and poverty. In
practice, the opposite has occurred. 
Critics of the big-bang approach point out
that GDP growth ignores the distributional
effects—including the rise in inequality—on dif-
ferent segments of the population. To capture
those and other social costs of transition, I use
indicators of social wellbeing produced annual-
ly by the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme. The UNDP’s Human Development
Index is a measure of well-being encompassing
not only per-capita incomes, but their distribu-
tion, the extent of poverty, and access to basic
needs such as housing, health, and education. 
When one looks at the HDI values for the
transition countries from 1990 to 2000 a dif-
ferent picture emerges from that painted by
the gradualists. In fact the HDI values for
Central Europe did not decline at all but saw a
steady increase, especially after 1995.20 Those
for the Baltics did fall significantly but more
than fully recovered by 2000, whereas those
for both CIS groups declined most dramati-
cally and by 2005 had not yet recovered their
1990 values. The clear conclusion is that more
radical reforms led to less social pain, not more.
Why are those results so different from
those found in many studies from the late-
1990s, such as the UNDP’s 1998 report Poverty
in Transition? First, earlier studies only had data
up until 1995 and 1996, covering the recession
period, and were bound to show a more nega-
tive picture of the transitions. Recent studies
confirm that significant turnaround in social
indicators for all the groups started in the mid
1990s.21 Second, even when it comes to the
early period, the majority of the studies
focused on the worst cases in the CIS countries
and did not adequately reflect what was hap-
pening in, for example, Central Europe.22
9
The effectiveness
of large-scale 
privatization was
dependent on the
transparency and
honesty of the
process.
Table 5
Approximate Gini Coefficient Values during Transition
Countries 1988–92 1993–96 2002–03
Central Europe 22 29 28
Baltics 25 35 36
SE Europe (3) 21 27 33
CISM 27 42 38
CISL 25 NA 33
OECD Lowest = Denmark 25
Highest =USA 40
Developing Lowest = Indonesia 30
Highest =Colombia 49
China Rural = 36
Urban = 32
Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Development Programme, Poverty in Transition (New York:
UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, 1998) and World Bank, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality: Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington: World Bank, 2005).
The turnaround and the superior perfor-
mance of advanced reformers can also be seen
in the patterns for the World Bank’s Gini coef-
ficient, which measures inequality and pover-
ty ratios (Table 5). The Gini coefficient is usu-
ally calculated on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0
represents perfect income equality and 1 rep-
resents complete income inequality. I have
multiplied the Gini coefficient values by 100
and averaged them for each country group. It
is important to emphasize that while changes
in the poverty ratio can be described norma-
tively as “deterioration” or “improvement,”
the same cannot be said for income distribu-
tion measures such as the Gini coefficient. In
the transition process some widening of
income distribution was not only to be expect-
ed as private ownership and the market re-
placed socialism, but it was also, at least to
some extent, desirable. In the free market sys-
tem, growing incomes serve as an incentive to
increasing productivity and entrepreneurship. 
Before 1989, the Gini coefficient was argu-
ably too low in socialist economies. It could also
be argued that extremely high income dispari-
ties are “bad,” partly due to efficiency reasons.
Very high Gini coefficient values reflect soci-
eties in which there may be huge political ten-
sions between lower and upper income groups,
with resulting instability, poor incentives for
labor, and inferior growth performance. This
paper does not attempt to pass a judgment on
what the right Gini coefficient should be after
15 years of transition, but only compares for-
mer communist countries to one another and
gives some benchmark references from other
countries.
As expected, income distribution widened
in all countries. In most cases, however, it nar-
rowed again after the mid-1990s. I have ana-
lyzed the Gini coefficient values for 2002 and
2003 and found that they ranged from 28 to 36
in the more advanced reformers of Central
Europe and the Baltics, and somewhat higher
in the CIS countries. Some studies show values
in the CIS countries that are much higher—40
or more in Russia, Georgia, Uzbekistan—but
given the wide variation of results, precision on
this issue is impossible. Nevertheless it appears
the trend for the Gini coefficient has been a rise
to the late nineties, then somewhat of a decline
and stabilization.
From an international comparison, it is
clear that the most recent Gini coefficient val-
ues in the post-communist world are not
greatly out of step with other market econ-
omies. The lowest Gini coefficient values are
similar to the lowest in developed countries,
such as Denmark, and the highest are compa-
rable to the top end, such as the United States.
In comparison with the developing countries,
the transition group looks more like Asia
rather than Latin America, which has very
high Gini coefficient values. In the mid-1990s,
which is to say before the significant recovery
in the CIS countries, some countries, includ-
ing Russia, did appear to be reaching Latin
American Gini coefficient values. But eco-
nomic growth has narrowed income distribu-
tion. It is of interest that China, which is often
cited as an example of a successful gradualism,
experienced a rise in the Gini coefficient to
well above 30—higher than  most of the post-
communist countries.
Poverty rates show a similar trend (Table
6).23 Pre-transition socialist economies had a
low incidence of poverty. However, it is
notable that many Soviet republics had pover-
ty rates similar to those of low-income devel-
oping countries—even during the communist
period. As transition started, poverty rates
rose sharply in most countries and then they
slowly declined. Recent poverty rates have, in
many cases, returned to the pre-transition lev-
els. However, the more gradual reformers of
the CISM not only saw a much greater wors-
ening of poverty up to the mid-1990s, but
also continued to experience poverty rates far
higher than those found in the CE and Baltic
countries. Even more telling is the trend in
CISL. The CISL governments rejected eco-
nomic reforms because of the accompanying
deterioration in some indicators of social well
being. But, they too experienced an early
jump in their poverty ratios and, in recent
years, have seen at best a partial correction
that was certainly far smaller than the correc-
tion experienced by advanced reformers.
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Again, the message is clear: early and rapid
reformers did not avoid an increase in pover-
ty altogether, but they suffered much less of it
and more than fully recovered by the end of
the decade.
Overall, the evidence on economic perfor-
mance and social costs seems to contradict the
first hypothesis of the gradualists, who argued
that gradual reforms would smooth and min-
imize adjustment costs.
Did the Privatization Experience
Vindicate Both Schools of Thought?
The second hypothesis advanced by the
gradualists states that privatization will not
yield the expected efficiencies unless the prop-
er institutional environment of a competitive
market is in place. A comprehensive test of that
hypothesis can be found in econometric stud-
ies which concluded that privatization without
good institutions does not result in significant
efficiency gains, but, accompanied by the disci-
pline of a competitive environment, the gains
can be considerable.24 Gradualists contend
that such studies confirm their views and in a
narrow sense they are right—better institutions
lead to better overall results.25 But in a lager
sense, as Table 3 shows, the only countries that
experienced considerable institutional devel-
opment were the rapid liberalizers—not the
gradual reformers.
The problem of assessing privatization is
closely linked to the problem of distinguish-
ing between countries that followed gradual
reforms and countries that followed rapid
reforms. Is it justifiable to call Poland a grad-
ual case, because the Polish government
moved very late to privatize large state-owned
enterprises? Compared to what and whom?
Poland was far ahead of most former com-
munist countries on small-scale privatization,
on market liberalization, and on developing
institutions. Does Poland’s experience with
late large-scale privatization confirm that
gradualism achieves better results than rapid
reforms? That is only true if the comparison
is with the Russian experience. Others who
privatized their large-scale enterprises more
rapidly than Poland, including Estonia and
Hungary, have surely achieved results as
good, and perhaps better, than Poland, not to
mention Russia.26 Even the Czech Republic,
which was much criticized for its too-rapid
large-scale privatization, cannot be compared
with Russia in terms of today’s outcomes. On
the other hand, slow privatizers, such as
Ukraine, show outcomes on most dimen-
sions inferior to Poland’s and more like
Russia’s. Privatization is only one part of an
overall reform strategy and cannot be used as
the sole criterion distinguishing the gradual
and the rapid reformers. 
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Table 6 
Range of Poverty Ratios by Country Group (percent)
Pre-transition Mid-transition Most recent 
Central Europe 0–13 1–25 0–7
Baltics 1–2 22–46 3–5
SEE 2–6 15–45 4–24
CISM 2–30
(Tajikistan = 50) 12–70
(Tajikistan = 96) 1–54
(Tajikistan = 74)
CISL 1–24 22–63 2–47
Source: Author’s calculations based on United Nations Development Programme, Poverty in Transition (New York:
UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, 1998) and World Bank, Growth, Poverty, and Inequality:Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Washington: World Bank, 2005).
Finally, consider Przeworski’s worry that in
democracies rapid reforms would lose politi-
cal support and lead to the reversal of reforms
or, to put it differently, that liberal markets
and liberal polities were in conflict. In the
broader literature on this issue, the evidence
remains mixed, but for the former communist
countries, the evidence is very clear. There is a
strong and statistically significant correlation
between economic liberalization and political
liberalization.27 Contrary to Przeworski’s the-
sis, in other words, liberal markets and liberal
politics went hand in hand in former commu-
nist countries.
Gradualist Theory Was Not Wrong, but It
Was Abused in Practice
No countries followed the prescriptions of
the pure gradualist model, but many politi-
cians used gradualist arguments to justify
delays in reform, allowing political insiders to
benefit from large rents, accumulate consider-
able wealth in the hyperinflation period, and
gain privileged access to the large-scale-privati-
zation process. 
One of the major theorists of gradualism,
Gerard Roland of University of California,
Berkeley, notes that “Insufficient attention has
been given so far to this issue of partial reforms
and the conditions under which it creates
momentum, or on the contrary, creates vested
interests that block further reform.”28 The
actual evidence from ex-communist countries
spanning 15 years suggests that the latter is the
case. Partial and/or delayed reforms, which
often also meant delayed macroeconomic sta-
bilization, have initiated a vicious circle, in
which rent-seeking opportunities were created,
great wealth was accumulated by those with
inside connections, and an oligarchy evolved.
That oligarchy, in turn, “captured the state”
and used its influence to block competition,
transparency, and even-handed application of
law, thus freezing both market transition and
democratic development. 
Table 7 shows the 1999 values from the
World Bank’s Index of State Capture for each
of the five groups of former communist coun-
tries.29 (State capture is a term denoting a situ-
ation where a group of economically powerful
interests is able not only successfully to lobby
the government in order to gain economic
benefits, but also has an overpowering influ-
ence on election outcomes and the general
direction of government policy.) The values,
which were estimated on the basis of extensive
surveys of business managers, were lowest
among the more rapid and advanced reform-
ers, and highest among the partial reformers.30
(Moreover, there is a significant negative cor-
relation between economic liberalization and
state capture. In other words, vested interests,
once entrenched, block further reforms.31)
So where did gradualism go wrong? It is
widely, though not universally, believed that
the theoretical models and theoretical conclu-
sions of the gradualist model were correct. In
practice, gradualism was hijacked by politi-
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Table 7
The World Bank’s Index of State Capture (1999)
Index Value
Central Europe 0.20
Baltics 0.18
SEE 0.35
CISM 0.38
CISL 0.10
Source: Oleh Havrylyshyn, Divergent Paths in Post-Communist Transformation: Capitalism for All or Capitalism for
the Few? (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), p. 192.
Note: The scale of the state capture index is from 0 to 1, with higher numbers denoting higher degrees of state capture.
cians who acted in their self-interest. The most
successful countries had committed leaders
with the interests of the nation in mind. They
could have followed a gradual strategy, but for
reasons that many of them have described in
their writings, they did not. Those reasons
included concerns that partial reforms would
result in rent-seeking and political self-inter-
est, the realization that liberalization could be
done quickly, and the belief that the necessary
institutional changes would follow.32
Policy Recommendations
For the country groups at the two extremes
of the spectrum, policy recommendations are
straightforward. Central Europe and the
Baltics have mostly completed their transi-
tions, except for institutional development,
and no longer face problems associated with
transitional economies. Rather, they face
problems associated with other emerging
market economies that include attracting cap-
ital inflows without inflation and overheating,
and maintaining fiscal prudence in the face of
democratic pressure. 
Belarus, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are
caught in the political and economic grip of a
Soviet-like regime. When a new opportunity
arises for transformation of those three coun-
tries into market democracies, the lessons from
Central Europe and the Baltics will be of great
relevance. The order of the day should be
speedy liberalization, opening of markets to
small business, transparency in privatization—
be it rapid or gradual—and parallel institution-
al development. Unfortunately, those coun-
tries face a big risk of falling into a trap created
by the mismanagement of transition in the
captured states. In captured states, citizens
have come to equate “capitalism” with private
ownership without appreciating the need for
competition as a mechanism for ensuring mar-
ket outcomes. 
Incidentally, this “trap” has global rele-
vance. A great deal of the resentment against
globalization arises from the same mistaken
understanding that private ownership alone is
all there is to capitalism. Economists must do
a much better job of clarifying publicly that
capitalism without free markets is not a true
capitalism and that only the competitive disci-
pline of a free market under the rule of law can
ensure the maximum benefits of a market
order.
In the middle of the spectrum, the countries
of SEE remain far from having genuinely free
markets. The most advanced countries, includ-
ing Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, score high
on the EBRD liberalization index, but lag on
institutions. For those countries that have not
yet become member states of the European
Union, such as Croatia and Macedonia, the best
strategy is to meet the conditions for the EU
accession, which proved to be a powerful disci-
plining force for Central Europe and the
Baltics. The extensive requirements of the EU
legislation, the so-called “acquis communau-
taire,” in effect required former communist
countries to undergo substantial market liber-
alization, transparency, and establishment of
democratic and open institutions. 
In the other Balkan countries, much more
is needed. Late starters, such as Serbia and
“noncountries” like Kosovo, are a case in point.
Though they are not on a formal EU accession
path, the carrot of an eventual membership
could provide a powerful incentive to move
forward with reforms. Given their small size,
the Balkan countries can learn from Hong
Kong and Singapore, whose open and liberal
economies performed much better than coun-
tries that tried to nurture their domestic indus-
tries. Montenegro, for example, began to apply
free-market and free-trade policies even before
it became independent.
The toughest nut to crack is the CISM
group of countries. The first constraint on
their development is the harsh reality that pol-
icymakers in captured states are, almost by
definition, unable or unwilling to apply poli-
cies that will reverse state capture. The
entrenchment of economic elites with a vested
interest in a frozen transition means that pop-
ular election victories as seen in the color revo-
lutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan,
do not by themselves unseat the oligarchs.33
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But there is room for action. At least some
of the newly rich are likely to see institutional
development, including greater protection of
property rights, as the best way to legitimize
their newly acquired wealth and status. They
may therefore be prepared to agree to policies
that will in the long run liberalize the econo-
my and the political space.
What are some of the policies that CISM
countries should adopt? First and foremost is
the liberalization of the business environment
with respect to small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SME). In most of the CISM countries,
the SME sector is vibrant and growing, but
still very small. Its growth is limited by bureau-
cratic barriers, arbitrary inspections, and high
taxation.34
While the oligarchs may not like the idea of
future competition, they stand to benefit from
growing middle class demand. Moreover, it is
difficult for oligarchs to claim that “we are just
good businessmen” and then oppose SME
development. Also, CISM countries should
allow greater external competition, especially
in the form of foreign investment. Foreign
firms bring with them business practices from
their home countries, which tend to be more
professional and transparent than the business
practices in former communist countries. In
the same vein, it is essential to create more
transparency in budget, tax collection, licens-
ing, and regulatory procedures. It is important
to achieve not only simplification of rules, but
also evenhandedness—a level playing field for
large and small firms and entrepreneurs.
There are also some measures that have to
be avoided. The promotion of SMEs by grants
and tax privileges is not a good idea. Govern-
ment subsidies remain a part of the psychology
of firms and entrepreneurs in many former
communist countries. But government sup-
port does not lead to the development of an
efficient small-business sector. More likely, it
leads to the continued reliance on government
handouts, shoddy service and high prices. The
best way to promote SMEs in those countries is
for the government bureaucrats to stop harass-
ing those businesses. 
Anti-corruption campaigns are also of
dubious usefulness. The powerful business
elites in the captured states do not fear them.
In fact, they find them useful, because anti-
corruption campaigns usually end up target-
ing less powerful small businesses and thus
undermine their competitors. Anti-corruption
campaigns also provide politicians with a use-
ful vehicle to claim, both domestically and
internationally, that they are fighting corrup-
tion. Another policy to avoid, even if the polit-
ical opportunity arises, is renationalizing
enterprises that were privatized in a corrupt
way and starting all over again. While a hand-
ful of egregious cases of privatization at bar-
gain prices can be reversed without serious
damage to investor confidence, a large num-
ber of renationalizations would be disas-
trous.35 It would send all the wrong signals to
investors, both large and small; it would tie up
the courts for years; and it would likely lead to
taking assets away from political opponents
and giving them to new political favorites.36
In their push to promote good government
and transparency, the international financial
institutions should exercise great caution in
supporting anti-corruption campaigns. As I
have noted, those campaigns are all too often
used as a façade aimed not at tackling of big
corruption, rent-seeking and state capture,
but at small businesses, which are then forced
underground and thereby destined to remain
corrupt.37
Finally, private sector players from industri-
al countries with potential business interests in
former-communist countries should also in-
sist—first and foremost—on transparency. Of
course, private sector players should be pro-
moting better institutions in general, but trans-
parency is perhaps the most important dimen-
sion of better institutions. Episodic promotion
of transparency is relatively easy—as when an
international oil company wishes to bid on a
Russian oil facility or oil exploration rights. But
the collective voice of all foreign investors
would be much more effective. There is a risk, of
course, that a call for better rule of law by for-
eign companies will seem hollow if at the same
time those companies yield to the temptation
of accepting special privileges. Many countries,
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after all, attract foreign investors by offering
them tax holidays, duty free zones and so on. It
is surely not in the long-term interest of either
the host country or the foreign investors that
foreign companies enjoy special privileges not
available to local firms. Such price distortions
are no better than discrimination between
favored domestic firms and others. 
Statements about the need for transparen-
cy, a level playing field for SMEs and better
rule of law, have more effect when they come
from a CEO of a leading multinational, rather
than when they come from World Bank or
IMF officials. The promotion of transparency
and equality before the law, though perhaps
difficult to coordinate, would be a useful addi-
tional contribution of the private sector to the
welfare of the post-communist world.
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